To know or not to know? Mentalization as protection from somatic complaints by Ballespí Sola, Sergi et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
To know or not to know? Mentalization as
protection from somatic complaints
Sergi Ballespı´ID1*, Jaume VivesID2, Naida Alonso1, Carla Sharp3, Marı´a
Salvadora Ramı´rez1, Peter Fonagy4, Neus Barrantes-Vidal1,5,6
1 Department of Clinical and Health Psychology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Catalonia,
Spain, 2 Department of Psychobiology and Methodology of Health Sciences, Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 3 Department of Psychology, University of Houston, Houston,
United States of America, 4 Department of Psychology & Lang Sciences, University College London,
London, United Kingdom, 5 Department of Mental Health, Fundacio´ Sanitària Sant Pere Claver, Barcelona,
Catalonia, Spain, 6 Centre for Biomedical Research Network on Mental Health (CIBERSAM), Instituto de
Salud Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
* sergi.ballespi@uab.cat
Abstract
Somatization processes are usually associated with a lack of insight or with emotional
unawareness, especially in adolescents where the ability for self-reflection is beginning to
mature. However, the extent to which different levels of insight explain variations in somati-
zation remains understudied. This study aimed to evaluate whether high-level emotional
awareness (comprehension) but not low-level awareness (only attention) is needed to psy-
chologically cope with suffering, thus leading to lower somatization. Specific predictions
were: 1) High attention along with High comprehension will be associated with significantly
lower frequency of somatic complaints than other combinations (Low attention and Low
comprehension, or High attention but Low comprehension); 2) In absence of comprehen-
sion, no attention will be more optimal than attention only, because only-attention might
work as an amplificatory of suffering without the possibility of processing it. Self-reports of
meta-cognitive processes, somatization, and control variables were obtained from 264 ado-
lescents from a non-clinical population (54.5% female; aged 12–18, M = 14.7, SD = 1.7). In
line with expectations, results revealed significant differences in the effects of insight posi-
tions on somatization: Attention+Comprehension (M = 4.9, SE = 0.9) < Nothing (M = 7.1,
SE = 0.3) <Only attention (M = 8.9, SE = 0.7). Compared to Nothing, Attention+comprehen-
sion was associated with significantly reduced somatic complaints (B = -2.2, p = 0.03, 95%
CI -4,1 to 0.2). However, Only attention was associated with increased somatic complaints
compared to the other two conditions (B = 1.8, p = 0.03, 95% CI 0.2 to 3.4; B = 4, CI 95%
1.6–6.3, p = 0.001, respectively). This highlights the role of higher-order awareness (i.e.,
comprehension or clarity) in the processing of suffering and stresses its value in the adaptive
coping of emotional distress.
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Introduction
The awareness of one’s own mental states—also referred as insight, metacognition, or self-
awareness—is present as a therapeutic aim in most psychological treatments [1–5]. Insight is
broadly defined as the ability to reflect upon and manage one’s emotions, and to utilize the
information provided by these emotions adaptively [6]. Insight has been associated with thera-
peutic adherence [7,8], and it constitutes a core active ingredient of most psychodynamic
interventions, including, for instance, Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) [9]. This high-
lights the importance of insight for mental health and spurs interest in how it works, i.e., how
it contributes to healthy psychological functioning.
The association between insight and emotional regulation [10–12] suggests that insight and
self-awareness might have an effect in the processing of suffering. Insight (i.e., the capacity to
be aware of one’s own mental states and to understand them) might contribute to really ’digest’
suffering or, in other words, to truly process it, unlike other forms of dealing with emotional
distress.
There are other ways in which humans deal with suffering (e.g., distraction, repression,
aggression, somatization), but they are usually associated with psychopathological symptoms
[13–15] and therefore considered less healthy. In fact, it can be assumed that emotional suffer-
ing is usually expressed through dysfunctional forms20—maladjusted behavior (e.g., aggres-
sions, self-aggression, substance abuse), somatic symptoms—precisely when it cannot be
mentalized [16–20]. This supports the idea that emotional insight prevents maladaptive forms
of coping with suffering because it helps to ‘digest’ suffering, i.e., it helps to face and under-
stand emotions instead of ignoring, avoiding, or expelling them.
Research on somatization supports this idea. Since the pioneering studies with alexithymia
[21,22], evidence for an inverse association between emotional awareness and psychosomatic
processes has been provided [23]. Problems of naming one’s own emotions [24,25] and recog-
nizing others’ mental states [26–28] have been found in several psychosomatic processes such
as somatization [29,30], chronic pain [31,32] or conversion disorder [33,34], amongst others
[35–37]. This association is consistently evidence-based for different stages (children, adoles-
cents, adults) [38,39], and across different approaches to the cognitive process involved. How-
ever, the lack of consensus in referring to this higher order cognition (e.g., emotional
awareness, facial perception, mood consciousness, theory of mind, alexithymia, self-knowl-
edge, meta-cognition, emotional intelligence, amongst others) impedes precisely identifying
what aspects or types of “emotional awareness” are considered in different studies.
It is possible that different degrees of awareness have different effects on the ‘metabolism’ of
suffering. Subic-Wrana and colleagues [27], for example, found that general levels of emo-
tional awareness are intact in many patients with somatoform problems, but they suffer more
specific impairments in awareness, such as the inability to link different emotional and bodily
states. Therefore, emotion recognition does not seem to be impaired in patients with somatiz-
ing disorders, but they are not able to interpret physical sensations as negative emotional states,
thus evidencing a lack of emotional clarity or deeper comprehension. This study points out the
importance of distinguishing different dimensions of a complex process such as emotional
awareness and reveals that somatization might be more associated with a problem of clarity or
meaning rather than simple emotion recognition.
However, as in many studies in the field of somatic complaints (e.g., [26–28,30]), Subic-
Wrana and colleagues analyzed emotion recognition regarding others’ emotions, probably
because emotional awareness is more easily measured regarding others’ emotions than regard-
ing ones’ own. This might explain why there is a gap in the literature regarding the awareness
of one’s own emotional states.
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Despite the interdependence among self and others’ dimensions of emotional awareness
[40], which allows inference based on others’ recognition, we assume that emotional awareness
of one’s own suffering might be more associated with somatization. Still, to our knowledge,
besides the relatively lower attention towards emotional awareness of one’s own states, there
are no studies analyzing how different dimensions of emotional awareness referred to one’s
own emotional states (meta-mood cognition) are associated with somatic complaints. The aim
of this study was to fill in this gap.
The awareness of one’s own mental states is a complex function involving several dimen-
sions and processes [41,42], and it cannot be assumed that the simple awareness of the exis-
tence of an emotional state is equivalent to its clarity or comprehension, which we consider to
be what helps to cope with suffering through ‘emotional digestion’. Moreover, it is possible
that a ‘superficial’ form of awareness (i.e., simple attention to emotional cues but without clar-
ity or comprehension) may not help to cope with suffering, or may even act by amplifying it—
as occurs when excessive attention to anxiety contributes to increase anxiety—while ‘deeper’
forms of awareness, including higher processing (i.e., comprehension), may help to process
suffering, thus reducing it. This is something suggested in the classic studies of Mayer and Sal-
ovey in the construction of their meta-mood cognition scale [6,12].
Mayer and Salovey [43–45] suggested that the process of emotional metacognition is com-
posed by a sequence of 3 mechanisms: attention, clarity, and repair. Although all 3 mecha-
nisms contribute to meta-cognition [6], authors distinguish between “the individual’s
willingness to attend to feelings” (i.e., monitoring moods, the degree of attention devoted to
feelings), their capacity to “understand one’s mood”, that is, “to experience these feelings
clearly” (i.e., discrimination, perception, deeper comprehension), and “their beliefs about ter-
minating negative mood states or prolonging positive ones” (repair or regulation).
In light of the above, the aim of the present study was to test whether different degrees of
emotional awareness differentially affect the tendency to somatize. We assumed that what has
a beneficial effect on the processing of suffering is not simple emotional awareness but higher-
order insight, that is, emotional clarity or comprehension. In terms of Mayer and Salovey’s
model, we considered that simple attention to emotional states constitutes a form of superficial
awareness that does not necessarily help to process suffering. By contrast, when attention is
accompanied by emotional comprehension, a different level of insight is possible.
Salovey and Mayer developed a scale based on their model of meta-mood experience. The
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) [6] is one of the few instruments to assess awareness of one’s
own emotional states, as the measurement of emotional awareness is more widely based on the
recognition of others’ emotions (e.g., [46–52]). The TMMS is also one of the most widely used
measures to this extent, probably the one with more evidence for its validity and reliability
(e.g., [53–58]) and, to our knowledge, the TMMS is the only scale allowing to distinguish dif-
ferent sub-processes of meta-mood cognition (attention, clarity, repair) in the same instru-
ment. Therefore, to operationalize our assumptions, we used a compound measure of meta-
cognition [6, 53] based on the dimensions of the TMMS.
On this base, we compared the frequency of somatization associated with three different
conditions: 1) High attention and High comprehension of emotional states operationalized
what we consider the most complete option of emotional awareness, i.e., not simple attention
but further processing of emotions. We predicted this position might be associated with the
lowest frequency of somatic complaints. 2) The opposite position (Low attention and Low
comprehension) was operationalized as the option with lowest emotional awareness, so it was
expected to be associated with a higher frequency of somatization than the first condition
(“insight”). 3) Finally, we considered that High attention to emotional states, accompanied by
Low capacity to comprehend them is probably the worst position against suffering, because it
Mentalization as protection from somatic complaints
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focuses on emotional reactions without the possibility to really deal with them. We consider
that this case places one in a position of emotional awareness permeability (High attention),
but without the possibility of defending oneself from suffering through further processing
(Low comprehension; so, we assume no psychological digestion). This is expected to amplify
instead of reduce suffering, so we predicted that it might be associated with an even higher fre-
quency of somatization.
To simplify reference to these conditions, briefer structures will be sometimes used from
here, like Attention+Comprehension or Insight condition instead of High attention and High
comprehension; Only attention instead of High attention but Low comprehension, or Nothing
instead of Low attention and Low comprehension. These briefer labels merely aim to improve
clarity by avoiding the repetition of complex combinations (e.g., High attention but Low
comprehension).
Overall, we expected that the best psychological option to deal with suffering, thus reducing
the tendency to somatize, is high attention and high comprehension. In the absence of high
emotional processing (comprehension), we expected that a defensive position of no attention
and no comprehension (“out of sight, out of mind”), is better than attention without further
comprehension, because this means a defenseless permeability (attention but no clarity) that
amplifies emotional indigestion, and therefore the probability of somatizing. Fig 1 expresses
these predictions visually.
The fourth possible condition (Low attention + High comprehension) is conceptually odd
from a sequence perspective and implies a sort of an unconscious or automatic insight, so it was
not considered in our predictions. This option was analyzed from an exploratory point of view.
In conducting our study, we were especially interested in the relation among insight and
somatization problems as they manifest in adolescents. Somatic symptoms are considered
altered expressions of emotional distress when people are unable to express emotional states
[15,59,60]. That’s why somatization is frequent in childhood, when cognition, language, and
especially mentalizing capacities are still in development [61]. However, given the intense tran-
sition that adolescence constitutes, somatic complaints are even more common in this stage
[62,63]. Besides, adolescence is known as an important developmental period for self-reflective
processes to emerge [64,65]. These facts along with the predictive value of somatization for fur-
ther psychopathology [66,67], and the interest to identify developmental psychopathology as
early as possible [68], imply that adolescence may be a particularly important developmental
period to observe the effects of insight on somatization processes because: 1) somatization is
especially frequent in adolescence, probably because insight capacities are not fully developed,
though 2) these capacities are more developed than in childhood, and 3) early intervention is
still possible within this developmental period in order to prevent more severe adult problems.
In evaluating our study hypotheses, we also considered the effects of neuroticism and inter-
nalizing psychopathology as these are recognized as main contributors to somatic complaints
[69–72]. Therefore, all the analyses controlled for the effects of these variables. Moreover, sex,
age, and socio-economic status (SES) are associated with psychopathology and also with
insight. Due to gender socialization, sex is a variable closely related both to somatization
[73,74] and insight [75,76]. Specifically, girls are expected to show better capacities to realize,
Fig 1. Prediction of frequency of somatic complaints among the three conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215308.g001
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name and think about emotions [77,78], especially in adolescence, because they mature before
boys. Additionally, insight is a higher order function that becomes more complex with age
[79,80], so older adolescents (participants were aged 12 to 18 years old) were expected to show
better insight capacities than younger ones. Finally, SES is a general risk factor for psychopa-
thology [81–84] and it has also been specifically associated both with somatization [85] and
with emotional insight [86,87]. Consequently, to reduce other sources of variation that might
affect the focus of the study, sex, age and SES were also controlled for in all the analyses.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
The study meets ethical standards according to Declaration of Helsinki and it has been
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CEEAH num.
2603, Spain). All families provided written informed consent. In all cases, informed consent
was provided from both adolescents and their parents or guardians.
Participants
The sample consisted of 264 adolescents (144 girls, 54.5%) aged 12 to 18 years old (M = 14.7,
SD = 1.7) from the general population that voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. From
those, 42.4% were aged 12–13 years old; 33.0% were aged 14–15; and 24.6% were aged 16–18.
Among girls, 35.4% girls were 12–13 years old; 36.8% girls were 14–15 years old; 27.8% girls
were 16–18 years old. Among the boys, 50.8% boys were 12–13 years old; 28.3% were 14–15
years old; 20.8% were 16–18 years old. This sample was recruited through schools in the con-
text of a broader project about psychopathology, personality and coping strategies in adoles-
cence. Somatic complaints are frequent in adolescence [88], so this warranted variability in a
sample from non-clinical population. The basic inclusion criterion in the current study was to
be between 12 to 18 years of age. The exclusion criterion was presence of severe mental illness
such as psychosis, autism spectrum disorder, or intellectual disability. Recruitment was carried
out through the schools to simplify logistics. Ten schools of similar characteristics (not rural,
similar size, similar families’ SES, similar educational orientation and methodologies, geo-
graphically close to each other) were invited to participate in the project according to their
proximity to the research center. The possibility to count on a wide eligible sample considering
the risk of low rates of participation was also a motivation to select 10 schools (i.e., in Catalonia
the participation of families in school matters is usually low, ranging from 10% to 20%). Five
of these schools agreed to collaborate, and n = 266 families signed the informed consent to par-
ticipate in the study. The principal reasons from families who refused were low interest in the
project, being too busy, refusal to give data about mental health or, in the case of some immi-
grant families, the inability to understand at least one of the two languages of the question-
naires (i.e., Spanish or Catalan). It was possible to obtain full data from adolescents in the 99%
of cases (n = 264). Approximately 71% came from families with middle socio-economic level
(11.6% low; 17.7% high) and approximately 87% were Caucasian (White-European), 9% Ara-
bic, 2% Asian, and 2% Latino.
Measures
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS-24). This is one of the few instruments to assess aware-
ness of one’s own emotional states, probably the one with the best evidence for its psychomet-
ric properties and, to our knowledge, the only one assessing different sub-processes of meta-
mood experience in the same scale. This widely used scale assesses attention, comprehension
Mentalization as protection from somatic complaints
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(emotional clarity) and beliefs about one’s own mental states [6,53]. We used the short version
of 24 items because: a) it suited our necessity of relatively brief instruments for a broad project
in which all informants had to fill out several scales, and b) this version counts on more
extended use than the original one, with adaptations to several cultures (e.g., [57,58,89,90])
and with more evidence of good psychometric properties in the Spanish adaptation (e.g.,
[53,89–92]). It consists of 24 items scored from 1 to 5 according to the degree of agreement. In
addition to a total score, the TMMS provides scores for the 3 dimensions of meta-cognition
defined through factor analysis [6] according to the model of Mayer and Salovey (attention,
comprehension and repair) [43,44]. The scores in the first two dimensions (attention and com-
prehension) are those used here to consider the contribution of different degrees of awareness
on somatic complaints. The scale of attention includes items such as ‘I pay a lot of attention to
how I feel’. The scale of clarity or comprehension includes items like ‘I almost always know
exactly how I am feeling’. The third process (regulation or repair) assesses beliefs about emo-
tional regulation (e.g., ‘Although I am sometimes sad, I have an optimistic outlook’). This third
scale was not involved in current hypotheses. The Spanish version of the TMMS-24 shows
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α from .86 to .90) and adequate test-retest reliability
(ICC from .60 to .83) [53]. Excellent internal consistency in the current study (α = .90) sup-
ports the reliability of this scale.
Somatic Symptoms Questionnaire (SOM). This instrument measures frequency of the
most common somatic complaints in childhood and adolescence (headache, dizziness, stom-
ach pain, fatigue and muscle pain) in the three months prior to the evaluation. It can be
answered by caregiver [93] and self-reported by children and adolescents [62]. Evidence sup-
ports good psychometric properties in Spanish samples for both versions [93,94]. The self-
report used in the present study showed adequate reliability for the evaluation of adolescents
(Cronbach’s α = .80) [62] (α = .70 in the present study).
Big Five Inventory (BFI). This is a 44-item inventory that measures five predominant
dimensions of personality (extraversion, convenience, consciousness, neuroticism and open-
ing) [95] through 5-point Likert scales ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Both
the original and the Spanish version show good psychometric properties [96,97]. The neuroti-
cism scale was used in the current study as a control variable. The internal consistency of this
scale was good in the Spanish version (Cronbach’s α = 0.80) [96] (α = .77 in the present study).
Beck Depression Inventory 2 (BDI). This is a widely used inventory based on 21 self-eval-
uative items, each with three symptom-choices reflecting the respondent’s experience over the
course of a week [98]. The Spanish adaptation [99] shows good psychometric properties (e.g.,
Cronbach’s α = .87) and the internal consistency in the current sample was excellent (Cron-
bach’s α = .90).
Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC) [100]. This is a self-evaluative 39
item questionnaire that measures anxiety symptoms in children and adolescents using a
4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all true about me) to 3 (it is often true about me).
Its psychometric properties have been tested in large samples from several countries and are
good for the evaluation of adolescents [101]. It shows excellent internal consistency (Cron-
bach’s α = .90) [100] (α = .88 in the present study).
Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents (SAS-A) [102]. Given the prevalence of social anxi-
ety (SA) in adolescence, this measure was also included beyond general anxiety as a control
variable. SAS-A consists of 18 self-statements referred to SA (e.g., “I worry about what others
think of me”) and 4 filler items. All of them are rated on a 5-point Likert scale according to
how much the item “is true for you”, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (all the time). The psycho-
metric properties of the Spanish adaptation are good [103], with internal consistency ranging
from α = .76 and α = .91 (α = .90 in the present study).
Mentalization as protection from somatic complaints
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Procedure
The study meets ethical standards according to Declaration of Helsinki and the revision of the
Ethics Committee of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CEEAH num.2603, Spain). All
families provided written informed consent for the different parts of the broad project called
“Personality, psychopathology and coping strategies in adolescence”. In the case of the current
study, families were informed about objectives, relevance, and implications through a letter
widespread by the school and were also invited to a meeting to solve any doubts regarding the
study. In all cases, informed consent was provided from both adolescents and their parents or
guardians. After obtaining the informed consent, data were recruited in the schools to simplify
logistics. The participants received the questionnaires in closed envelopes with their identity
encrypted with alphanumeric codes and were given a deadline to return them. Missing values
and out-of-range values were detected in order to contact the participants to rectify them. The
data collection took approximately five weeks in every school, occurring between January and
June of 2013.
Statistical analysis
The degree of insight was operationalized as a combination of 2 dimensions of this capacity:
the attention to emotional states, and clarity (comprehension) [6]. These variables were
dichotomized before combining them to make predictions. The main reason for this transfor-
mation is based on reliability. We think that a subjective measure of a subjective process
(meta-cognition) that involves this process in the assessment, is not so refined as to provide a
reliable quantitative measure. The measurement of emotional awareness is mostly operationa-
lized in the reading of others’ mental states, probably because this allows to present people
with standardized materials (pictures, cards, films, animations). This is the case of well-estab-
lished measures such as the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition [46], the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes [48] or The Frith-Happe´-Animation task (FHAT) [47]. However, it is dif-
ficult to operationalize one’s own subjectivity, and therefore it also is the cognition about one’s
own subjectivity, which leads to the necessity of using self-reports. This introduces an abnor-
mality: one’s own meta-cognition is assessed using one’s own meta-cognition, so nor the pro-
cess neither the object of assessment is objectifiable for an external observer.
This is why the assessment of social cognition is mostly based on “reading” others. We do
not want to renounce to assess subjectivity, because we think that it is the metabolism of one’s
own suffering what is mostly associated with somatization. However, we do not rely on subjec-
tivity providing a refined quantitative measure of one’s own meta-cognition. Accordingly, we
transformed the quantitative self-reported measures of attention and comprehension into
dichotomous variables based on distinguishing only High / Low. Beyond the apparent loss of
information, we benefit from a simpler, more trustworthy measure.
The 75th percentile was used as a cut-off for dichotomization. This allowed us to clearly
identify and group those participants with a good comprehension and attention, while keeping
enough participants in each group to perform the data analyses. Since the interest was focused
on the protective value of emotional insight, if high level of insight processes (i.e., above the
75th percentile) did not play a role, it could be deduced that neither will low levels.
According to the scores of attention and comprehension (scores above the 75th percentile
were considered high in both dimensions), 4 insight conditions could be distinguished. Those
with High attention and High comprehension were considered those with the best combina-
tion to deal with suffering according to the hypothesis (Fig 1). By contrast, those with Low
attention and Low comprehension were those with the least awareness. According to the
hypothesis, the non-mentalization of suffering is expected to be associated with more
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somatization. However, the least optimal mental position regarding somatic complaints was
expected to be that with High attention to emotions but Low capacity to process them. Thus,
High attention but Low comprehension was expected to be associated with the highest fre-
quency of somatic complaints. This option leads to a position of “defenseless permeability”
that allows “seeing but not digesting”, so people in this position are expected to become
flooded with “unprocessed” emotion. Finally, the group with Low attention and High compre-
hension was not considered in the hypothesis because it refers to a sort of automatic emotional
insight (comprehension without attention).
Linear regressions were performed to test the effect of emotional insight on somatic com-
plaints. All regression models included as potential confounding variables the main contribu-
tors to somatic complaints, i.e., neuroticism (operationalized as the score in the neuroticism
subscale of the BFI), and internalizing problems (operationalized as the scores derived of BDI,
MASC and SAS-A), as well as sex, age, and SES (operationalized through the Hollingshead’s
index) [104].
Regression backward model selection was conducted, using IBM SPSS Statistics v20.0 pack-
age (IBM Corp, 2011) [105] to fit each model. The results of the association between MZ cate-
gories and frequency of somatic complaints are presented as linear regression coefficients (B)
for quantitative responses, reporting 95% confidence intervals (95% CI), and P-values (P). The
polychotomous variable of emotional insight position was entered the regression model as a
dummy variable taking Low attention + Low comprehension as the reference category.
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables involved in the analyses.
Sex distribution consisted of 57% males in the group with High attention and High compre-
hension, 46% in the group with Low attention and Low comprehension, 15% in the group
with High attention but Low comprehension, and 70% in the group with Low attention but
High comprehension. Among the 264 participants, only 23 participants show the most advan-
tageous position (High attention along with High comprehension). The most frequent MZ
Table 1. Descriptives and correlations.
Descriptives
M (SD)
Correlations
Att+Comp
n = 23
Nothing
n = 163
Only att
n = 41
Only comp
n = 37 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Somatization 4.4 (4.2) 6.9 (4.4) 10.6 (6.2) 5.0 (4.3) -
2. MC—Total 100.2 (7.7) 66.1 (11.6) 81.1 (12.6) 87.6 (8.8) -0.15� -
3. MC—Attention 32.3 (3.2) 19.8 (5.1) 32.4 (2.8) 20.9 (4.9) 0.17�� 0.64�� -
4. MC—Comprehension 35.7 (3.1) 21.8 (5.1) 21.7 (5.6) 34.9 (3.0) -0.25�� 0.79�� 0.21�� -
5. Neuroticism 19.8 (6.1) 23.0 (4.8) 26.6 (4.9) 19.3 (4.9) 0.31�� -0.15� 0.28�� -0.31�� -
6. Depression 5.7 (7.0) 8.8 (7.3) 15.2 (8.9) 4.5 (5.3) 0.44�� -0.18�� 0.27�� -0.35�� 0.47�� -
7. Anxiety 43.4 (12.2) 40.7 (14.1) 51.3 (15.4) 39.7 (16) 0.34�� 0.01 0.33�� -0.21�� 0.39�� 0.43�� -
8. Social anxiety 42.1 (13.3) 45.3 (12.0) 51.7 (14.4) 41.8 (15) 0.22�� -0.11 0.22�� -0.28�� 0.35�� 0.40�� 0.68�� -
9. Age 169.6 (18.8) 175.2 (22.3) 184.8 (15.8) 165.3 (15.5) 0.15� -0.06 0.21�� -0.14� 0.13� 0.28�� -0.01 0.08 -
10. SES 2.7 (1.3) 2.6 (1.2) 3.0 (1.3) 2.6 (1.3) 0.09 0.04 0.12 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.17� 0.14� 0.09
MC = Meta-cognition. Att+Comp = High attention + High comprehension; Nothing = Low attention + Low comprehension; Only att = High attention + Low
comprehension; Only comp = Low attention + High comprehension.
�P < 0.05
��P < 0.005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215308.t001
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position was Low attention and Low comprehension (n = 163), while ‘partial positions’ were
present in 41 (High attention but Low comprehension) and 37 (Low attention but High com-
prehension) participants, respectively. As expected, somatization is positively correlated with
attention but negatively with comprehension.
Fig 2 shows that mean frequency of somatic complaints differs among insight positions
according to hypotheses. Thus, High attention and High comprehension (Att+Comp) shows a
lower frequency of somatization (Adjusted M = 4.9) compared to Low attention and Low com-
prehension (Nothing) (Adjusted M = 7.1). Therefore, “insight” compared to “blind” position
reduces somatic complains (B = -2.2, CI 95% -4.1 to -0.2, p = 0.03). Only attention, with an
Adjusted M = 8.9, is the worst situation, since it increases somatic complaints compared to
Nothing (B = 1.8, CI 95% 0.2 to 3.4, p = 0.03) and also to Attention+Comprehension (B = 4, CI
95% 1.6–6.3, p = 0.001). Given that it was not considered in the hypotheses, the figure does not
include the fourth insight position (Low attention, High comprehension), which in terms of
somatic complaints (Adjusted M = 6.1; 95%CI: 4.6–7.5) is placed between Attention+-
Comprehension and Nothing
Discussion
The aim of this study was to analyze the association between different types of emotional
awareness and somatization in adolescence–a developmental period characterized by the
growth of somatization problems as well as an increased capacity for psychological insight.
Specifically, the frequency of somatizations in cases of: a) attention along with comprehension,
b) attention only but without comprehension, and c) low general awareness (no attention + no
comprehension) were compared.
In line with our predictions (Fig 1) the combination of high attention and high comprehen-
sion was associated with the lowest frequency of somatic complaints compared to the other
options. This supports the idea that comprehension beyond ‘simple attention’ is needed to
reduce somatization. This is reinforced by the fact that the option based on only high attention
(with no high comprehension) is associated with the highest frequency of somatic complaints.
This suggests that attention followed by emotional clarity or comprehension might diminish
somatic complaints, while attention alone increases them. In light of these findings, attention
Fig 2. Effect sizes of each insight category on somatic complaints taking Low attention + Low comprehension as the reference category.
Mean frequencies of somatic complaints within insight positions and effect sizes of each insight category on somatic complaints taking Low
attention + Low comprehension as the reference category, and controlling for age, sex, SES, neuroticism, anxiety and depression. Notes: High
attention and High comprehension (Att + Comp); Low attention and Low comprehension (Nothing); High attention but Low comprehension
(Only attention). Adjusted mean (M); Linear regression coefficients (B), 95% mean confidence intervals (95% CI), and p values (P).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215308.g002
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without comprehension is not only not protective against somatization, but actually exacer-
bates it.
A possible explanation is that attention without comprehension might lead to a sort of emo-
tional indigestion, or a state of emotional overloading due to a lack of emotional processing.
This might explain why the absence of higher order processing (comprehension) following
simple emotional awareness (attention) is associated with the highest level of somatization. By
contrast, attention followed by comprehension might help to process suffering, thus making
“unnecessary” other ways of draining it, such as somatization.
The findings reported here can be interpreted in the broader context of mentalization-
based approaches to psychopathology [18,41,106–112]. Mentalizing is a multi-dimensional
construct that refers to an imaginative activity by which we reflect on our own minds and the
minds of others [9, 10,42,113]. The dimension of mentalization referring to one’s own mental
states constitutes a meta-cognitive process [114–117], and while it denotes a broader set of pro-
cesses than assessed through the TMMS-24 [6,12,43], the attention and comprehension of
one’s own emotional states are part of this set. That’s why the Mentalization paradigm provides
a helpful conceptual framework for interpreting our findings. Besides, it enables translational
conclusions to be drawn given the fact that mentalizing is the treatment target of Mentaliza-
tion-based Therapy.
Our results, interpreted in the context of mentalization-based theory [42,114,117] suggest
that mentalizing (or reflection on) of emotional states prevents somatization because compre-
hension plays a role in the emotional metabolism, while the non-mentalization of emotional
states fosters somatization, especially when emotions are detected but not understood. This is
consistent with the idea that when people cannot “digest” what they see, not paying attention
to that content can be a better option. This is consistent with the popular advice “out of sight,
out of mind”, as well as the use of distracting CBT techniques to reduce suffering. However,
since current results highlight the internal process of “comprehending” as an important step
towards “true insight”, implications for mental health should be considered.
The pending question of “to know or not to know?”, or whether self-knowledge benefits
mental health, against the usually recommended option of “out of sight, out of mind”, should
be answered in light of intermediate processes and individual differences. Considering the
“full emotional awareness” or insight as a complex process involving different mechanisms
(for instance, attention as a low-level consciousness, followed by comprehension as a reflective
meta-level involving meaning) [6,43], individual differences regarding this capacity might also
be more complex than a simple issue of degree. That is, if people differ not only in their general
level of mentalization but in their style to address emotional states (true insight, mind-blind-
ness, overwhelmed . . .), then this implies that the best treatment might not be necessarily
equal for everybody, but it might depend on the capacities of the patient. This idea has already
been highlighted in the literature [118]. In the current case, for instance, it leads one to wonder
if all patients with high somatization, who are assumed to show low mentalizing capacity,
might equally benefit from a mentalization-based treatment. This is especially important in
adolescence, when somatic complaints are highly frequent [62,63] but mentalizing capacities
are still in development and therefore may vary substantially [77–80,86]. This state of flux
likely introduces even more individual differences than in adulthood making more critical the
election of treatment [119].
In light of current results, if comprehension is a good mechanism to deal with suffering and
therefore reduces dysfunctional phenomena such as somatization, then people able to compre-
hend might benefit from treatments based on insight. However, assuming that even in lack of
high comprehension, a treatment focused on mentalizing could be elected, there is the addi-
tional question of whether treatment approaches should be designed equally for the two
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groups with high somatization, independently of the presence of high attention. This leads to
the interesting question of whether it is possible to mentalize without attention. Three consid-
erations should be presented regarding this issue.
First, from a sequential perspective of the achievement of insight [6], assuming that ‘com-
prehension’ was built upon a pre-existing ‘attention’ stage, then the condition of low general
insight (low attention and low comprehension) should be the worst-case scenario in terms of
mentalizing, because it lacks both necessary steps in the way to insight (attention and then
comprehension) compared to the position that includes attention (even without comprehen-
sion). However, our findings support that attention without comprehension is worse than
nothing in terms of somatization. In fact, the condition with only attention predicts signifi-
cantly more somatization than all the other conditions. So, paradoxically, adolescents in the
low general awareness condition (low attention and low comprehension) could be more prone
to benefit from a mentalization-focused treatment (because they are not overwhelmed by emo-
tion) than those with only attention, prone to become flooded by exaggerated emotional states.
This should be qualified from a developmental perspective. Since this is a sample of adoles-
cents and they experience greater emotionality than adults (i.e., they become more easily over-
whelmed by emotions) this possibility should be also analyzed in adults to test the influence of
developmental issues. For instance, it should be examined if also adults with “high attention
but low comprehension” become so “overwhelmed” as adolescents might do, thus producing
more somatic complaints than other insight positions.
Second, it should be considered that the tendency to view impaired mentalizing as a func-
tion of increased emotional arousal is not necessarily a cognitive pattern or a stable trait, but it
can be associated with context-dependent variations. This might explain why problems of
emotional dysregulation can be successfully treated with MBT (Mentalization Based Treat-
ment) [111,120]: because there are some preserved mentalizing abilities beyond situational
mentalizing problems. This has been suggested for the case of Borderline Personality Disorder
[109], and it is also the case of somatoform patients with impairment in embodied MZ [121].
Embodied mentalizing is the capacity to see the body as the seat of emotions, and the capac-
ity to reflect on one’s own bodily experiences and sensations [121]. Evidence supports that
the impairments of embodied mentalizing in somatoform patients are specifically related to
interpersonal situations and experiences that involve high arousal or stress [121], but not to all
situations. Since the current study is based in on one way of operationalizing mentalizing pro-
cesses through a focus on insight, future studies may benefit of assessing context-dependent
variations of mentalizing capacities across time. Once more, this is especially interesting in
adolescence for the developmental reasons already mentioned (i.e., more emotional instability
and more variable mentalizing capacities). Thus, it is attractive to speculate that: a) emotional
instability is higher than in adulthood, so there is “more to mentalize”, b) excessive emotional
arousal might situationally impair base mentalizing capacities more frequently (so, there is
“more emotionality to mentalize” but lower capacity to do it, because mentalizing is still devel-
oping in adolescence and it probably becomes more frequently impaired by excessive emotion)
and, therefore, c) beyond the developmental variability in base mentalizing capacities, higher
situational variation should be considered. The assessment of these developmental and con-
text-dependent variations may shed new light in future studies.
Third, the question of whether it is possible to mentalize without attention leads to consid-
ering the fourth position (high comprehension without high attention). It is interesting to
point out that this kind of awareness, involving high comprehension, is characteristic of 1/3
more participants (i.e., n = 36) than Insight (n = 23), suggesting that high comprehension is
not only possible without high attention, but it is even more common than with high attention,
and it reflects some sort of automatic or implicit mentalizing ability [42]. The presence of such
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an ability to this extent in our sample: 1) supports the idea of a dual process [122], and 2) sug-
gests that it is an extensive phenomenon, leading to the question of whether people tend to
mentalize more implicitly than explicitly, and 3) whether “implicit mentalizing” is better or
worse than explicit emotional insight.
The mean of somatic complaints of Comprehension without attention falls between the
insight position (Attention+Comprehension) and low general awareness (No attention neither
comprehension). This suggests that high comprehension alone (“implicit mentalizing”) might
be better than high attention alone, which in fact is associated with the worst cognitive position
regarding somatization. This reinforces the idea that higher order awareness (comprehension)
is needed to metabolize suffering and reduce somatic complaints, even in absence of high
attention. This interesting result deserves further attention in future studies. Given the prox-
imity of the means, the position of “Implicit mentalizing” also suggests that implicit or auto-
matic emotional awareness is not better than explicit insight in this context of somatic
complaints.
The point discussed above is reasonable from the perspective that “true” emotional insight,
understood as high-level emotional processing, might involve a high level of both processes
here assessed (i.e., high attention and high comprehension). Nevertheless, expertise is usually
associated with the automaticity of processes in all of life’s dimensions [123]. Accordingly, it
might be attractive to speculate that the sophistication of fully explicit mentalizing through
practice and time means the automaticity of some processes, which then become implicit
because they require less conscious cognitive resources (i.e., they require lower attention), thus
releasing cognitive capacity for higher-order emotional processing.
Current results do not support this. Since the full position (High attention and High com-
prehension) predicts the lowest level of somatic complaints, it is odd to assume that this posi-
tion is only a stage towards an apparently less efficient position in terms of somatization
(Implicit mentalizing). In fact, since this is a sample of adolescents and high-order mentalizing
capacities are achieved later in life [80], it could be hypothesized that “true insight” is infre-
quent here because it is a final stage of mentalizing development still not achieved in adoles-
cence. The predominance of positions without comprehension might also explain why
children and adolescents tend to somatize more than adults. To shed light on these develop-
mental issues, this study should be replicated with adults. Since mentalizing is expected to be
more developed in adults, and adults tend to somatize less than adolescents, it could be
hypothesized that adults will show less prevalence in the “permeability” condition (attention
without comprehension, the worst position) and a higher frequency of the “insight” condition.
Along with the necessity of replication, current limitations should be considered. The main
one is the difficulty of measuring awareness or insight of one’s own emotional states. There are
few measures that assess meta-cognition of one’s own mental states, and all of them are based
on self-reports; and of course, to inform about one’s own meta-cognition, meta-cognition is
needed. This is probably why most studies of somatization operationalize emotional awareness
through the recognition of others’ emotional states instead of the self. Therefore, future
research should improve methods to assess emotional awareness, self-insight or self-mentaliz-
ing, thus allowing replication of current findings with more refined measures, or even making
possible an experimental design using controlled lab situations. The existence of more accurate
measures might also make possible addressing new questions, such as whether high attention
contributes to difficulties in comprehension (clouding judgment), or whether comprehension
is possible without attention (automatic mentalizing). Moreover, since the lack of precision
attributed to a self-reported measure led us to carry out analyses with dichotomous variables
(high/low), a more refined “objective” measure of mentalizing referred to one’s own mental
states might make possible the analysis of continuous variables. A lab situation, despite
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decreasing ecological validity (because the emotional states needed to be meta-recognized
might have to be induced), may improve reliability. Finally, regarding measurement of higher
order cognition, the stability of mentalizing abilities should also be assessed, along with situa-
tional variations of these capacities. This might allow analysis of context-dependent variations
in somatic complaints. As a second limitation, since the sample used is self-selected and based
on adolescents, generalization to general population is not possible. In fact, all current results
must be considered in light of the developmental issues mentioned elsewhere. Additionally,
voluntary participants recruited through schools for unpaid studies are usually healthier than
the general population. Thus, those with more risk of somatization and those with lower men-
talizing skills tend to self-exclude from participation. Therefore, an epidemiological study with
a more representative sample of different stages of development is necessary to verify current
findings and address new questions, such as whether people tend to use more explicit or
implicit mentalizing, or which one is better to deal with suffering. A fourth limitation is the
lack of control of other sources of variability. Although anxiety, depression and neuroticism
have been included in the current study as control variables, further variables should be con-
sidered in future studies. For instance, chronic stress, which has been defined as a precipitating
factor for somatoform disorders [121], or social support, which might be associated to emo-
tional socialization [124].
Consequently, future studies with refined measures and representative samples should cap-
ture in greater depth the meta-cognitive abilities involved in emotional processing and the
‘metabolism’ of suffering, as well as its relationship with somatoform processes. In this sense,
the assessment of mentalizing using Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) [125] might
help to improve the ecology, stability and context-dependence of meta-cognitive measures,
despite the fact that it does not solve the lack of standardization of mentalized stimuli (i.e.,
one’s own subjectivity). Therefore, future research should also address this pending question,
which involves operationalizing (through experimental induction) or objectifying—if this is
possible—individual subjectivity.
Conclusions
Despite limitations, this study is the first to our knowledge to analyze the separate contribution
of two levels of awareness of one’s own emotional states (attention vs. comprehension or clar-
ity) to the frequency of somatic complaints. Current results confirm predictions and are con-
sistent with previous findings: mentalizing appears to be protective against somatization, and
the inability to mentalize is associated with a higher frequency of somatic complaints. Further-
more, our findings support that different degrees of insight explain variations in the frequency
of somatic complaints, and highlight that 1) comprehension is needed to achieve a level of
insight associated with reduced somatization, probably because it helps to process suffering
through psychological skills, and 2) low-level of emotional awareness (simple attention but
without comprehension) is not only insufficient to prevent somatization, but it can even be the
least optimal option, since it probably works as an amplification system and it is associated
with the highest frequency of somatic complaints. These results have been obtained with a
sample of adolescents from the general population, which means higher tendency to somatize
and more developmental variability in mentalizing capacities than in other stages. Knowing
that, age and sex were controlled for in all analyses, results were explained in key of develop-
ment, and need for replication with new samples (e.g., adults, clinical) has been pointed out.
Beyond these considerations, this is the first study to highlight the role of comprehension
beyond simple attention in the processing of suffering, and to stress the value of emotional
understanding (higher-order awareness) in adaptive coping with emotional distress.
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Supporting information
S1 File. 20190423 Data MZ-somat.sav. This is the file from which all data analyses were per-
formed.
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